

# BOOK REVIEWS

## EDITOR'S NOTE

Earlier this year we asked five of our staff members to review the most recent Nader publications. Our view that some sort of consensus on the Nader series might thus be reached turned out to be mistaken: these books are not of one cloth. However, one or two observations seem warranted. The reviews point up what is perhaps the most serious shortcoming readers will encounter in this series—the piecemeal approach to reform. No one theoretical viewpoint knits these volumes, or any single volume, together. The editors detail “problems” and offer (in less detail) “solutions.” Yet, there is little sense of system in their grasp of, or in their response to, American social, economic, and political ills.

In consequence, it is never quite clear to whom these books are addressed. Casual readers may be engaged by the sharply-told accounts of corporate and governmental misdeeds. No doubt interest groups will underscore some passages as useful polemical texts. Bureaucrats and planners may glean an occasional policy insight. The general reader may be put off by the ponderous footnoting. The professional will call for more and redder scholarly meat. Some will find the prescribed reforms too tame, others too radical. In short, there is a little something here for everyone, but not quite enough to satisfy anyone.

Perhaps Nader would here point out that his purpose is to begin, not to end, debate; to energize the impulse to reform, not to dictate what ultimate form it should take. Perhaps Nader aims to steer that middle course between academic respectability and popular acclaim, satisfied to evoke from as wide a readership as possible no more (but no less) than the hopeful response, “Yes, change there must be.” If that is his aim, then we might simply wish him success—and reserve our subtler criticisms for the more ample debate to follow.

**CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA.** Edited by Ralph Nader and Mark J. Green. New York: Grossman Publishers. 1973. Pp. x, 309, \$7.95.

This loosely organized collection of essays presents a variety of views of the problems posed by modern supercorporations and their great control of wealth and power. It is the result of Ralph Nader's “Conference on Corporate Accountability,” held in Washington in 1971, which brought together a variety of scholars and professionals to “discuss proposals to restrain corporate power . . . [T]he aim of the conference, and therefore of this book, is to push beyond diagnosis to prescription, to emphasize not merely what is wrong but ways to right it” (p. vii). No attempt is made to synthesize the various analyses and proposals. Instead, as the editors explain in their preface, the object is to generate as many policy ideas as possible, some of which might appeal “both to the public and to the policy-makers” (p. vii). The book pro-

duces an image (viewed from many angles) of the tremendous concentration in a small elite of top corporations of economic and political power, power that will not be diminished or redistributed (to the public or the state) without determined, far-seeing and fundamental reform. But such reform requires a deeper and more focused view of precisely "what is wrong" than *Corporate Power in America* provides; unless the reader comes to the book with this kind of theoretical perspective, he or she is apt to find the book's many policy proposals difficult to compare and evaluate.

The essays are arranged in three parts. The first part, with contributions from John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert A. Dahl, co-editor Green and Senator Fred R. Harris, provides a rather uneven background to "Problems of Corporate Power." Galbraith sets the tone for a discussion that never occurs when he states that the problem of the overweening power of the large corporations can only be dealt with by viewing them as public, rather than private, entities, and by putting in issue "the future structure of the economic system in the most profound sense" (p. 9). This will involve, he says, a willingness at least to talk about socialism, but Galbraith and his co-contributors apparently lack this willingness. Political scientist Dahl urges the creation of a Senate committee to study the large corporation in detail and at length, starting with the assumption that it is both a far-reaching social enterprise and a public political system. Dahl sketches the questions that such a committee might ask, but beyond suggesting that some form of employee control and/or ownership might prove workable, he offers no concrete alternative to what he views as the failings of "shareholder democracy." The article by Senator Harris plunges the reader abruptly into an anecdotal and somewhat predictable account of corporate political power. Harris argues that the supercorporations' exercise of political leverage rarely depends upon illegal acts, but rather flows from a community of interests between government and big business on many levels. Co-editor Green, on the other hand, provides some of the book's more startling revelations about the impact of the large corporations on the communities they inhabit. His is a picture generally of decreasing corporate concern for the immediate social and physical environment; of feudalistic proprietorship of "company towns" from St. Marys, Georgia, to Manville, New Jersey; of token civic affairs projects which raise more expectations than they ever satisfy; of local tax structures and investment practices that impoverish the very communities that welcome corporations and boast of large corporate "citizens." Green's clincher is the stunning statistic that corporate charitable contributions, often cited as persuasive evidence of an active civic conscience, fall off (as a percentage of net income) as corporate size increases, and that average corporate contributions (as a percentage of net income) are less than half that of an individual taxpayer (pp. 56-57).

Part Two presents what may be taken as the book's, and Nader's, central policy recommendation: the establishment of a uniform system of federal chartering of all corporations of substantial size (the top 1,000, Nader suggests, p. 83) doing interstate business. Through the mechanism of the charter, its proponents argue, it should be possible to re-establish that original concept of the corporation as a fiction created by, and accountable to, the state to promote the state's economic and social policies. Federal incorporation would sweep away the mass of individual state corporation laws, which, collectively, can

exert no more restraint upon corporate power than their least common denominator. (Witness, for example, the competition among the states to "liberalize" their business codes in order to attract corporations, a competition long led by tiny Delaware.) At the same time, federal incorporation could become the focal point for the development of the first truly thoroughgoing federal regulatory legislation in this area. Nader suggests five lines of legislative and judicial action, some of which are taken up in later essays: (1) increased movement toward "corporate democracy," including the election of public, consumer, or employee directors, and stricter controls on management activity; (2) vigorous enforcement of tighter antitrust laws—e.g., a twelve percent limit on control of any oligopolistic industry; (3) development of detailed information-disclosure requirements; (4) "constitutionalization" of corporations by bringing them within the ambit of the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment, an area in which only tentative first steps have been taken by the judiciary; and (5) development of rules by which the full social cost imposed by corporations upon the local, national or consuming public will be borne by the corporations themselves. Principal among the suggestions here is the judicial and legislative facilitation of the class action suit (pp. 84-89).

The remaining essays in Part Two expand on these proposals, and together they make a suggestive and persuasive case for federal chartering, attractive in several respects. The United States, as Nader's article makes clear, is not without some experience in federal chartering. At the forefront of several debates over corporate power in our history, it is a proposal sufficiently linked with currently accepted legal and economic doctrine as to appear at least possible to implement, although its appearance in Congress would surely touch off a classic test of corporate political power in the efforts to defeat it. And it is difficult to think of any major reform of the relationship between corporation and state, up to and including socialism, which could not make some use of a federal chartering mechanism. Still, it is hardly a panacea, as its proponents concede. There is nothing to prevent a federal chartering law from re-enacting, in effect, the corporate law of Delaware on a national basis—and there is, no doubt, much to encourage it. Like the incorporation laws of the several states, (which, Nader insists, are part of the *problem*), and like the regulatory experiments of the New Deal (which one contributor uncharitably describes as "parceling out government power to various organized economic interests to better enable them to control the public," p. 217), the proposal for a federal chartering system speaks more to the form than to the substance of change.

Part Three of *Corporate Power in America* might have been provided for those readers who tend toward over-optimism. Although jointly entitled "Other Restraints on Corporate Power," the six concluding essays might as fairly have been headed, "Other Restraints on Corporate Reform." There is a telling dissection of that easy phrase, "corporate social responsibility;" a pessimistic assessment of the courts' past and future role, in holding corporations to account; a plea for recognition of and response to corporate crime as such; a review of the dismal record of the regulatory agencies; and a historian's view that the consciousness of Americans will have to be raised a great deal before the role of corporate reformers can go beyond "continuing to pick away at Prometheus' liver" (p. 181).

*Corporate Power in America* raises more questions than it can be expected to answer. To the interested general reader, it will serve as a useful and informative introduction. To those who want to follow up on points too briefly made, there are ample notes and bibliography. Yet it cannot be said that the book succeeds in its avowed purpose of emphasizing "not merely what is wrong but ways to right it." Because there is no consistent theory of corporate power presented in these pages, policy recommendations seem premature, sometimes palliative, even as one sympathizes with the call to action long overdue. The essays themselves warn that great institutions are not to be tinkered with lightly, and "[g]reat currents of history cannot be reversed by small laws" (p. 7). *Corporate Power in America* should be read as a forceful presentation of the need for action, and for the much deeper understanding of corporate power that must shape it.

M.S.

POLITICS OF LAND. By Robert C. Fellmeth. New York: Grossman Publishers 1973. Pp. xvii, 715. \$15.00.

In *Politics of Land* a Ralph Nader Task Force undertook an ambitious study of the abuses associated with the ownership and use of land in California. As Mr. Nader points out in the Introduction, the group focused upon California because of its geographic diversity, its rapid growth in recent years and its anomalous position as one of the most urbanized states, but also the nation's leader in dollar value of agricultural production.

The major economic premise of the study was that, insofar as possible, those groups that benefit from expenditures of public money should pay the price of providing them, including their indirect social costs. The Task Force generally succeeds in exposing instances in which political and economic power were utilized to give large business interests a disproportionate position in the ownership and use of land.

The Task Force's study of agriculture presents a well-reasoned analysis of the misuse by large land-holding interests of land suitable for agriculture. The first example of this misuse is "urban land sprawl," the phenomenon that occurs as suburbs gradually expand and encompass land suited to agricultural uses. The Report delineates how such by-products of urban sprawl as air pollution and altered tax bases contribute substantially to the demise of the small, privately owned farm.

The second form of misuse of agricultural land is an outgrowth of the increased importance of corporate farming. The Report illustrates how corporate farms are able to utilize favorable tax treatment of large portions of their expenditures, exploit cheap labor and skillfully manipulate water rights to lessen competition by individual farmers.

The third misuse of land available for agriculture is a result of the increasing use of chemical fertilizers harmful to the environment. Although both large and small farmers are guilty of this practice to some extent, the ability of large corporate farms to extract volume discounts and the close ties of some large

agricultural interests to regulatory agencies make them primary offenders in this area.

The Report also shows how such closeness to regulatory agencies allows large interests to garner a disproportionate share of available water supplies while the public shoulders much of the expense. Although the allegations made by the Task Force in this area are not as well documented as most of the others in the Report, it seems clear that the average taxpayer pays for much more water than he or she actually receives, thereby providing large landowners with a healthy subsidy. The Task Force also indicates that lack of adequate funds for proper supervision and ineffective use of enforcement tools prevent state and regional pollution control boards from effectively combatting water pollution.

The Report deals at length with the abuses that occur when previously undeveloped areas are converted to residential usage. The Task Force contends that more care must be exercised in planning to avoid converting agricultural or wild life areas where sufficient demand for housing does not exist and to provide proper coordination between public expenditures and legitimate developmental needs. The Report suggests such remedies as stricter requirements for developers to show that a proposed development will actually benefit the community, stricter performance bond standards to "encourage" developers to complete projects they begin, and stricter prosecution of fraudulent activities of developers to discourage the swindles found all too frequently in this area. The Task Force focused exclusively on one county to illustrate exactly how highly fragmented local structures with a tangle of specialized local boards (e.g. school boards and planning boards) tend to minimize the visibility and accountability of local government and present special interest groups with an ideal opportunity to control these governmental entities.

The credibility of publications by the Nader Task Forces has been attacked. But *Politics of Land* relies heavily upon public land records and other governmental and private sources to support most of its accusations. In addition, one should consider the audience toward which this Report was directed. Consisting of over 500 pages and including somewhat detailed scientific analyses and voluminous empirical data, the Report is obviously well suited to serve as a research tool for environmental and political groups. But the information is a matter of interest to the general public as well. The 1974 elections saw the "coming of age" of environmental concern as a viable political position. The point is graphically illustrated by the election of Richard Lamm, a long time advocate of environmental causes, as governor of Colorado. The scarcity of many of our natural resources has caused more people to become disillusioned with policies which emphasize untrammelled growth. This requires the Task Force to attempt to achieve a delicate balance. If too much of the intricate supporting data is excised from the Report it loses a degree of effectiveness as a tool and its critics will step up their attack on the credibility of the Report. But if a simplified version of the Report could be distributed to a wider range of people, the ultimate effectiveness of the Report might be enhanced.

Members of Nader Task Forces have been criticized in the past for being overzealous gadflies, probing into areas where they did not belong. The reaction of some of the governmental and business officials, as quoted in *Politics of*

*Land*, certainly indicates that many of these officials viewed Nader and his associates as wild-eyed radicals. Therefore, to give the Report maximum effectiveness, its authors should have been vigilant to maintain a high degree of objectivity. Unfortunately at times the Task Force members failed to do so. Casual derogatory remarks addressed toward Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon do little to enhance this work. The authors also occasionally make the error of "preaching" to the reader. For example, after an examination of the rampant abuses of the political process perpetrated by lobbyists representing large land interests the Report declares in a burst of flaming rhetoric that control of government by these interests "approaches a form of socialism in which the state does not control the means of production but the means of production control the state" (p. 486). Although there were few such passages in the Report, it was these deviations from an appearance of objectivity that were seized upon by critics in an attempt to discredit the entire Report. In other areas, however, the Report displayed admirable objectivity. Environmental groups, natural allies of the Task Force, were not immune to criticism. The Report noted how lack of communication and even petty squabbles often prevented environmental groups from presenting a united front to advocate their interests.

*Politics of Land* is a significant contribution to the literature on the subject of land use. Although it focused exclusively on California, one cannot realistically doubt that the abuses elucidated here do not exist in other states as well. This book does not merely criticize the abuses it found; rather it presents a number of feasible measures for reform. Although one can wish that the findings had been presented in a manner more palatable to the general public, and can criticize the Task Force for occasionally abandoning its dispassionate examination of the issues, one cannot deny that *Politics of Land* is a formidable potential weapon in the battle against the destructive and short-sighted philosophy of growth for growth's sake.

G.R.B.

THE MONOPOLY MAKERS. Edited by Mark Green. New York: Grossman Publishers. 1973. Pp. xv, 400. \$8.95.

Regulatory agencies are the unacknowledged offspring of our polity. No interest group will admit to a part in their creation. Everyone criticizes their behavior. Yet, few politicians suggest they be abolished, grudgingly recognizing their necessity. The generally accepted theory is that the agencies arose out of the ferment of the late nineteenth century populist movements. Some economic historians, however, argue persuasively that the agencies were conceived and reared by eastern industrialists and financiers.

As the debate continues, so do the cleavages. Ralph Nader maintains in his preface that these institutions are simply branches of the corporate clan, promoting the very monopolistic behavior they purport to control. In turn, this contention is rejected by the business community which often cites the income statements of companies subject to regulation as evidence for its position. Indeed, the perennially low profits therein hardly suggest favors bestowed.

Nonetheless, amid the crossfire of accusations, both Nader and the busi-

ness community admit that some forms of regulation are necessary to protect both public and private interests. Whatever the failings of the agencies, it is generally conceded that the market is unable to protect consumers adequately from economic abuse. Similarly, there is little argument over whether natural monopolies, unrestrained by competition, must be subject to public controls. And even the business community might be uncomfortable leaving the growth and development of such vital areas of industry as energy, transportation, and communications to the "invisible" and unsteady hands of competition.

A book that could clarify and resolve many of the seemingly contradictory problems that arise from regulation would be understandably welcomed by many students of administrative law. *The Monopoly Makers*, a collection of essays prefaced by Ralph Nader, is not that book. The failure of *The Monopoly Makers* to provide an understanding of the problems confronting governmental regulation of industry stems from the book's appealing, but limiting, premise that the actions of agencies can be best explained if agencies are viewed as extensions of corporate interests. While there is some validity to this viewpoint, an analytical framework based solely upon it is unable, as the book proves, to explain the many actions the agencies take which are clearly contrary to business self-interest. Thus, in chapters four through six, the writers contend that the transportation industry is regulated by supposedly beneficent agencies, but do not explain how "beneficence" has led the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board to cripple economically the railroads and airlines. Likewise, identifying the agencies with the industries they regulate forces the book to either ignore or play down serious attempts of the government to follow progressive policies.

Further, the book is unable to offer any substantive reforms capable of meeting or anticipating problems it cites as endemic to regulation. What reforms the book does offer often portend problems as bad, and perhaps worse, than the ones it hopes to solve. In chapter two, the writer argues persuasively that Community Antenna Television (CATV) has the potential for undermining the oligopolistic control that the national networks exercise over the television industry. Never, however, does she address herself to the problems inherent in CATV. No safeguards are advocated which will help guarantee that CATV, a natural monopoly to the communities it serves, will not be just as unresponsive to local needs or diversified programming as are the networks.

Ostensibly, *The Monopoly Makers* covers the entire range of governmental participation in the economy, including the purchase of goods and the setting of tariff and patent policy. These latter topics, however, are examined superficially, and the impression is that they have been added as filler material. Chapters eight and nine discuss the corruption and abuse of public trust in defense spending and the purchase of drugs. They give a good view of the needless waste and excess profits that permeate governmental procurements, and reforms are offered which suggest strongly that something can actually be done. These chapters should have been expanded into a separate book where their impact might have been greater. The last two chapters of the book adequately summarize the time-worn ground of free-trade tariff and patent policies but add little new.

*The Monopoly Makers* does not provide illuminating insights into the role of governmental participation in the economy. Nor does it offer a well thought-

out program of needed regulatory reform. It is only a series of articles of varying quality, loosely held together by a damagingly incomplete framework of theory. If instead of allowing diatribe and exposés to serve as foundation, Mr. Nader and Mr. Green had insisted upon analysis of the difficulties of evolving effective and socially desirable economic policy from case by case adjudication and random promulgations, the result might have been a coherent explication of the processes and problems inherent in the present system of regulation. Likewise, a clear and objective discussion of the proper economic standards which regulators use or should use in determining policy might have enabled the book to suggest meaningful policy reforms. Allowing the writers to demonstrate that the public is being abused, without providing insight into the cause of that abuse, traps this book within its own rhetoric.

H.J.S.

THE LAST STAND. By Daniel R. Barney. New York: Grossman Publishers. 1974. Pp. xxi, 185. \$7.95.

Ralph Nader's name on a book raises expectation of some good old American rabble-rousing and muck-raking. *The Last Stand* is no exception. This time the enemy is the forest industry, chiefly the National Forest Products Association (NFPA), its national lobbying organization. The NFPA keeps the Forest Service and Congress under constant pressure to give as much national timber as possible to the industry. Daniel Barney, a second year law student, headed a group of eleven lawyers and students who examined Forest Service files and spoke with various government officials, conservationists, and timber industry personnel. Their finding that the national forests are being destroyed through the machinations of the NFPA is obviously meant to serve as an impetus for the citizenry to take action.

The good guys are the citizens' groups and the environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club and the Isaac Walton League, which actively lobby for the preservation of the national forests. They are clearly the underdogs in the struggle, although Barney never makes known their exact strength or resources.

In opposition to the preservationist groups, the NFPA lobbies in Washington to affect both legislation and Forest Service policies. Maximum control over three areas is attempted—quantity of timber subject to commercial sale, methods of timber cutting, and plans to increase timber yield. In the first area the NFPA, spurred by the decline in private timber inventory, urges maximization of the timber cutting in the national forests. Second, the industry strongly supports clearcutting, a method of clearing the land by harvesting all the trees in a given area. Clearcutting maximizes the yield, but arouses antagonism because it denudes the landscape and encourages erosion. Finally, the NFPA opposes land policies which will increase yield but require heavy investment. Barney calls the policy "cut out and get out."

The NFPA justifies these policies by warning that more conservationist practices would lead to higher prices in the construction of homes for consumers. Barney maintains that this is "bunk" because lumber accounts for only



a small portion of construction costs and so, without limits on labor, land, and financing, the prices of new homes will not be kept down. The slowness of transporting lumber to the retailers also creates price increases. He notes further that substantial increases in allocations have been demanded when use could be made of previously purchased national forest timber. Barney argues that the desire for greater profits rather than any real need explains this attitude. It seems, however, that to some extent he underestimates the industry's problems. The private supplies of timber are decreasing sharply, and the effect on housing costs could become significant. Profit is undoubtedly a motive, but the industry is certainly going to need wood in the future; the industry's request is not just spurious.

Caught somewhere in the middle of this battle is the Forest Service, with a mixed legacy of environmental and commercial planning. Congress has given only minimal direction to the Forest Service. In 1960, Congress passed the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act which vaguely defines multiple use as "the management of all the various renewable resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people." Without specific legislative pronouncements, the Forest Service is more vulnerable to external pressures when it determines the framework of multiple use.

Congress and the President make the situation worse. Receiving the majority of his information on the subject from the NFPA, the President through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has sharply cut the Forest Service's requests for funds, especially in recreational areas. The OMB under President Nixon even "placed in reserve" some of the appropriated money. The Congress accepted these OMB reductions of the Forest Service's budget. Barney explains that Congress is understandably receptive to the NFPA because selling the timber produces income—and votes—by keeping those in the forest industry employed.

The Forest Service, left to the pressures from the timber lobbyists, has generally succumbed, despite its mixed attitudes. For example, clearcutting has been allowed despite the existence of other techniques less harmful to the forests and less destructive to recreational uses of the area. Further, it has failed to fulfill its duty to inform citizens of plans for the national forests.

The author hopes to arouse the public to take action to change this one-sided attitude. Nader says in the introduction:

*The Last Stand* is a disturbing case study of Congressional default and Presidential gamesmanship with special interests; it also suggests that the Forest Service's leadership, if its conservationist impulses were given more public support, would work to reduce the dominance of the loggers in the management of National Forests.

Nader's books tend to take a simplistic approach to the political process, and this book is no exception. The reasoning is that congresspersons do whatever is politically expedient, so a popular outcry against current policy can make them set down explicit conservationist standards. This is, the reasoning continues, the only way to lessen the congressperson's susceptibility to money and influence from the other side. The variable of the congressperson's original viewpoint or honest belief is ignored. Also, the book demonstrates a doc-

trinaire view of exactly what is in the public interest. "True" citizens will desire preservation of maximum-sized forests, presumably even if it brings them unemployment and higher prices.

This by no means implies that *The Last Stand* is of little value. On the contrary, its complaint about the shabby treatment of recreational needs is valid, and its suggestions for alternative cutting methods, government funding of research, and increased public involvement in the decision-making process are worthwhile. The book is a well documented and exhaustive study of the subject. But its value is undercut by its simplistic bias toward the political process and its willingness to discount any other views as being unsuited to its definition of what is in the public interest.

B.E.O.

THE MADNESS ESTABLISHMENT. By Franklin D. Chu and Sharland Trotter. New York: Grossman Publishers. 1974. Pp. xxiv, 232. \$7.95.

The Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 grew out of the attempts in the early 1960's to find sweeping solutions to problems. It was optimistically hailed as providing solutions to mental health problems by supplanting mental hospitals with increased out-patient care, treating the patient in the context of his or her community, and making mental health treatment available to all economic classes. *The Madness Establishment* concludes that the community mental health centers set up under this Act have generally failed to meet these goals. The authors, Chu and Trotter, are respectively a student at Yale Law School and an associate Editor of the APA (American Psychological Association) Monitor. Their book, though giving some background information on the National Institute of Mental Health, is mainly an evaluation of the Community Mental Health Centers Act from the perspective of the consumer of mental health services.

One major goal of the Act was to provide outpatient centers as an alternative to state hospitals. The authors found that such centers often became merely a service for referring people to state hospitals. Even when hospitals connected to centers were releasing many patients, this often was not because the patients were being given outpatient care after release, but rather because the hospitals were simply increasing their releases of patients. Many released patients were put into "foster homes" which were totally inadequate in terms of treatment, or even physical facilities. Thus despite the purpose of the Act, most centers had negligible numbers of outpatients.

Furthermore the centers failed in their goal of serving all classes in the community. They have served mainly those who can afford psychiatric care, with the poor continuing to be sent to state hospitals. Many centers have become primarily hospitals for psychiatrists' private patients. In part this has been deliberate, in part a result of economic pressures. Many hospitals became involved with the Act because of the federal money provided for construction of "community mental health centers," with no intention of substantially increasing their contacts with poor people. Even where centers wished to serve

the poor, finances were against them. Federal grants under the Act were set to decline over several years, and be replaced with local funds. Often these funds did not become available, due to tight state budgets and the resistance of state hospital bureaucracies to cuts in their budgets. Private health insurance was not a viable source of funds since most plans have restrictions on mental health costs generally, and do not cover outpatient mental health care or services by nonmedical mental health professionals. Medicaid and Medicare also provide very limited mental health coverage, varying from state to state. Lack of contact with the community was further indicated by the failure of many community health centers to make themselves known to local service agencies and by the location of some centers outside the area they were to serve or beyond reach by public transportation of the poor they were to serve.

Failure to meet the goals of the Act is partially explained by lack of enforcement. The regulations governing the amount of aid a center had to give indigents were too vague to be enforceable. Centers were to provide certain services to qualify for federal funds. But many centers deviated greatly from the standards and none were denied federal funds. In addition, evidence of simple abuse of funds was uncovered, including hospitals using mental health center funds to build facilities which were used rarely, if ever, by mental patients. Such abuses were uncovered when the NIMH began evaluating the programs of the centers. The authors believe that this evaluation was late and generally ineffective, but that some promising methods have been developed.

The essential failure of the Act, according to the authors, is that emotional problems and aberrant behavior were treated as a form of mental disease (and solely within the province of psychiatry) rather than as a result at least in some cases of a person's environment (and thus requiring various sources of treatment). This viewpoint led the centers to develop as traditional psychiatric centers, with the emphasis on inpatient treatment. The control of the centers' programs by psychiatrists with a natural interest in retaining the status quo in mental health treatment reinforced this attitude. The centers failed, therefore, to use paraprofessionals found in the community and trained by the centers. Indeed, even non-medical mental health professionals such as social workers and psychologists were largely excluded from involvement in the centers.

People crippled by problems of crime, poverty and drug addiction cannot always be helped by labeling them "sick" and assigning psychiatrists to treat them. The authors assert that people whose problems are an outgrowth of their environment must be dealt with in the context of that environment. First, this requires coordination between mental health people and other service agencies. Second, it requires use of paraprofessionals to help people to deal with their problems such as finding a job or apartment. Whether or not our society can or will provide all these services, the authors are correct in decrying the tendency to put inappropriate problems into the hands of psychiatrists.

The authors consider their book to be more investigative journalism than a scientifically controlled study. Though the book discusses many centers, the last third of the book contains case studies of a few specific centers. Those centers do not fulfill the standards of the Act. Whether any other centers do is difficult to guess. The authors claim that these centers were recommended to them as good centers and they discovered no better ones. Though basically critical of the centers they studied, the authors do acknowledge beneficial as-

pects of even muddled programs. Their account seems on the whole a fair one, and their bias is clearly stated from the beginning.

The study underscores again (as has been discovered with other Great Society programs) the futility of attempting to solve social problems with a federal program that does not squarely face political realities, such as the entrenchment of bureaucracies and people with interest in the maintenance of the status quo, and economic realities, such as the inability of states to take over funding of federal programs. *The Madness Establishment* is a testament to admirable goals gone astray through just such a failure.

R.A.S.