The due process clause has become a talisman of sorts for criminal defendants. The clause has been relied upon both to invalidate rules prejudicial to the defendant and to require procedures to protect him. In Chambers v. Mississippi the Supreme Court once again called upon this bulwark to extricate a defendant from criminal conviction.

The Court, however, may have been too eager to draw its due process sword. Although a proper result was reached in Chambers, the Court’s analysis may diminish the protection heretofore provided by the Constitution. Via analysis notable for its lack of forthrightness, the majority transplanted the right of cross-examination from the confrontation clause to the due process clause by substituting a balancing test for the absolute standard of the sixth amendment. The implications of this maneuver become clear when it is juxtaposed with the Court’s refusal to declare the denial ofthe right of cross-examination, by itself, to constitute reversible error.

Having devitalized the right of cross-examination, the Court found it necessary to consider a second claimed denial of due process. Ironically, in so doing, the Court set the precedent for further expansion of due process protection. The Court invalidated the mechanical application of a state rule of evidence as contrary to due process, thereby opening the way for future attacks upon state evidentiary rules which previously were otherwise immune from constitutional assault.

This Comment will discuss the propriety of the Supreme Court’s employment of due process, its holding, and the implications which follow therefrom.